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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
ELIAS R. DeALO, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 860232-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
UIBISUIQXIQS 
This appeal i s from a convic t ion of possess ion with 
intent to d i s t r i b u t e a contro l led substance, a second degree 
f e lony , af ter a t r i a l in the Sixth D i s t r i c t Court. This Court 
has j u r i s d i c t i o n to hear tne appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 7 8-2a-
3 (2 ) (e ) (Supp. 1986) . 
&lbimMX^Z„l&SllES-Z&E&m2&Q-Q8-bZEZbL 
1 . Does the defendant have standing to contes t the 
search of the veh ic l e? 
2 . Did the t r i a l court properly permit an ins truc t ion 
to go to the jury on aiding and abett ing? 
3 . Did the t r i a l court properly admit into evidence an 
a f f i d a v i t and search warrant for a res idence in Cal i fornia? 
4 . Did the t r i a l court properly admit in to evidence a 
dope ledger made by defendant? 
CQWSlIlUlIQtiAL«fBQyi£IQM5^.£lAIUl£S^.AJaD^£i2L£5 
The s t a t u t e s pert inent to tne i s s u e s raised on appeal 
are s e t forth in the body of the b r i e f . 
Defendant, Elia R. DeAlo, was charged with possession 
with intent to distribute for value a controlled substance, in a 
jury trial held Nay 19 and 20, 1986, in the Sixth Judicial 
District Court, in and for Sevier County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Don A* Tibbs, Judge, presiding. Defendant was 
sentenced by Judge Tibbs on July 2, 19 86, to not less than one 
year and not more than 15 years at trie Utah State Prison, and 
fined in the amount of $10,000.00. 
mi£UEiiX-DE_£&£I£ 
On February 1 2 , 1986 at about 5:15 p .m. , Ofticer James 
D. B i l l an of the Utah Highway Patrol stopped a v e h i c l e for 
speeding (T. 7 1 ) . Defendant and co-defendant Rafael V i l l a were 
in the cart defendant was driving (T. 7 1 , 82-83 , 168) . After 
running a check through the Utah Highway Patrol computer, Ofticer 
B i l l an received information that the car was reg i s t ered to 
Antonio V i l l a of Flushing, New York (SHT 12-13 , T. 8 4 ) a The 
report a l s o indicated that there was a suspended s t a t u s on the 
l i c e n s e p l a t e (SHT 12 , T. 8 4 ) . Upon request , defendant produced 
a va l id Cal i fornia d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e ; (T. 83) and co-defendant 
V i l l a , produced a New York d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e (SHT 1 5 ) . Co-
defendant V i l l a a l so produced car r e g i s t r a t i o n showing Antonio 
V i l l a as the reg i s t ered owner (SHT 1 4 ) , and indicated that 
Antonio was h i s brother (SHT 1 6 ) . Defendant Indicated that the 
two sen were on vaca t ion , t rave l ing from Cal i forn ia to New York 
(T. 84, SHT 1 6 ) . 
1
 The abbreviation "SHT* will be utilized to indicate the 
Supression Hearing Transcript. 
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The officer became suspicious based upon the appearance 
of the two menf the appearance of the car, the suspended status 
of the license plate, and the aroma from the car (T» 72)• 
Officer Hillan asked if there were controlled substances in the 
car and defendant indicated there were none (T. 72). Oft icer 
Hillan then asked defendant if he would consent to a search of 
the vehicle (T. 72). Defendant readily consented (T. 85)• 
Officer Hillan prepared a handwritten consent to search which 
defendant then signed (T. 73, 85)• 
Otficer Hillan proceeded to search both the passenger 
compartment and the trunk of the car (T. 7 4). Upon looking in 
the trunk, Officer Hillan observed "a metal container fabricated 
into the vehicle to the front portion of the trunk," (T. 75, SHT 
17, 22). Officer Hillan then removed the bottom portion of the 
back seat, revealing chrome plated hinges riveted to the 
floorboard of the vehicle (T. 76)• At this point the search was 
suspended until a search warrant could be obtained to search tne 
metal container (T. 77). When the officer opened the metal 
compartment he discovered five packages wrapped in duct tape (T. 
79)• Defendant denied any knowledge of the metal container and 
the contents in the container (SHT. 23, T. 176). 
Analysis of the five wrapped packages determined that 
each of the packages contained cocaine (T. 92). Both defendant 
and co-defendant Villa were charged with possession with intent 
to distribute a controlled substance, under Utah Code Ann. S 58-
37*8 (1953 as amended), (R. 1). 
•3 
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress the 
evidence obtained as a result of the search (R. 31-32). Although 
defendant was not the owner of the searched vehicle, he argued 
that he had a proprietary and possessory interest in the car 
because it contained some of his personal belongings (SBT 8)• 
However, at the time of the search defendant denied any knowledge 
of the metal container, and the five packages ot cocaine within 
the container (SHT 23). After hearing arguments, the court found 
that defendant had no standing to contest the search (SHT 30)• 
After a two-day jury trial, defendant was found guilty 
of possession with intent to distribute a controlled suDstance. 
£U£ftA£X_QE_&£SUtt£J3I 
Defendant lacks standing to contest the search of the 
vehicle. The fact that defendant was an invited guest in the 
vehicle coupled with his denial of the metal container in the 
trunk and the cocaine therein did not give defendant any 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle. 
The trial court did not err in giving a jury 
instruction on aiding and abetting under Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-
202 (1978). Since no facts exist to support an arrangement for a 
distribution by defendant, SlAtfi-JU-flicltsn# 659 P.2d 103 8 (Utah 
198J) is inapplicable in the present case, and defendant was 
properly charged with possession with intent to distribute a 
controlled substance for value. 
An affidavit and search warrant for a California 
residence was properly admitted into evidence as non-hearsay. 
The exhibit was not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted 
4-
and was only necessary to lay a foundation for the testimony of 
the officer. Assuming the exhibit was hearsay, defendant has 
failed to establish any prejudice from the exhibit. 
Finally, a dope ledger made by defendant was properly 
admitted into evidence. The evidence was not admitted to show a 
bad disposition on the part of the defendant, but instead was 
necessary to establish opportunity, knowledge and intent on the 
part of defendant. 
£QIti2LI 
DEFENDANT LACKS STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE 
SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE. 
Defendant a l l e g e s that he had a l e g i t i m a t e expectat ion 
of privacy in the veh ic l e searched. S p e c i f i c a l l y , defendant 
contends that he and co-defendant V i l l a had permission to use the 
car for a two week vacat ion , that defendant had a key to the area 
searched, and that defendant had made the automobile h i s 
temporary home. 
Both defendant and the State agree tnat an individual 
has standing to object to the lawfulness of a search only i f he 
has a " leg i t imate expectat ion of privacy" in the item or premises 
searched. £akas_y J ._I l l in£iSr 439 U.S. 128 (1978) . "A person who 
i s aggrieved by an i l l e g a l search and se i zure only through tne 
introduct ion of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third 
person's premises or property has not had any of h i s Fourth 
Amendment r i g h t s infr inged." JBatofi, 439 U.S. at 134, d i i n a 
AldfiUDaD^Y-a-IlDiUfia f^iJtAJtfifi# 394 D.S. 165, 174 (1969) . The fact 
that the defendant may have been " leg i t imate ly on [ the] premises" 
such that he was in the car with the owner's permission does not 
determine whether he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
the particular areas of the automobile searched. Bakas* 439 U.S. 
at 148. 
Further, "the proponent of a motion to suppress has the 
burden of e s t a b l i s h i n g that h i s own Fourth Amendment r i g h t s were 
v io la t ed by the challenged search or s e i z u r e . " jtafcajs 439 U.S. 
131 n. 1 . In JBafcas, the Court re jec ted the defendants1 c la im/ 
"since they [ the defendants] made no showing that they had any 
l e g i t i m a t e expectat ion of privacy" in the searched v e h i c l e . Id* 
at 148. £££ fllfifl £3*llDfl£_^_E£DiU£i^, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980) 
(the defendant must prove not only tnat the search was i l l e g a l , 
but a l s o that he had a l e g i t i m a t e expectat ion of privacy in the 
object searched); I2nitfid_Siai£5^A_SalXUCCi* 448 U.S. 83, 92 
(1980) (no va l id fourth amendment claim absent "a factual 
f inding" that defendants had a l e g i t i m a t e expectat ion of privacy 
in the area searched); I2ni£fifl_SJtflJt££_Xx_£li£JteflB# 732 F.2d 788, 
790 (10th Cir . 1984) (fourth amendment claim regarding search of 
airplane depended upon whether the defendant " s u f f i c i e n t l y showed 
lawful possess ion or control to confer s tanding," and was 
dismissed because he had "fai led to show lawful posses s ion of the 
plane g iv ing r i s e to a l e g i t i m a t e expectat ion of pr ivacy"); 
flnilfid-SJtiJififi«Y^flblfiflQllf 748 F.2d 1371, 1375 (10th Cir . 1984) 
(no s tanding , because defendant did not prove that he had 
l e g i t i m a t e expectat ion of privacy in automobile); S£aJtfi_X* 
BfiUfiiSflDr 102 Idaho 90
 f # 625 P.2d 1093, 1095 (1981) 
("defendant had the burden of proving that he had a l e g i t i m a t e 
expectation of privacy in the Pontiac"); EfiflBlfi_xA-EfiflIfiail# 190 
Colo. 313, , 546 P.2d 1259, 1264 (1976) (to •establish 
standing to challenge a search and seizure, the challenger has 
the burden of alleging and proving that he has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy"); 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 11.3 
(197 8) ("The burden is on the defendant to show that he had 
lawful possession of the auto or was otherwise present therein). 
This case, on the facts presented to the trial court, 
is indistinguishable from SJfcfl££_Xju.Yald£Z, 6B9 P.2d 1334 (Utah 
1984). There, a unanimous Court held that the defendant, who did 
not own the car which he was driving and which was the object ot 
the search complained of, lacked standing to complain of the 
search which followed a stop made by police officers. In 2ald£Z, 
like the present case, the defendant disclaimed any ownership 
rights in the car and the briefcase found in the car (SHT 21-23). 
It is clear from YaldfiZ that mere possession of property, or 
presence therein or thereon, without some showing of a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the effects searched is not enough to 
gain standing to challenge the search* Theretore, defendant who 
did not own the car (but was merely a passenger in a borrowed 
car) and did not show any legitimate expectation of privacy in 
that car (mere possession not being sufficient), lacks standing 
to challenge the search of the car and ultimate seizure of the 
c o c a i n e . * Yaldfiz, 689 P.2d a t 1335, c i t i n s 5iflifi«2A-EuX£fiil$ 586 
P.2d 441 (Utah 1978); £fllSflS_Y*_llliQSiS, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) . 
Sfifi Alfi£ JStfltfi-XjL-CQDSJtflDtillflr 732 P.2d 125 (Utah 1987) (absent 
claimed r ight to p o s s e s s i o n , defendant could not a s s e r t any 
expectat ion of privacy in the items se ized and had no standing to 
object to the s e a r c h ) . 
Defendant r e l i e s upon several federal c a s e s to support 
h i s argument that he had a l e g i t i m a t e expectat ion of privacy in 
the area searched (App. Br. 13-16) • However, a l l of the cases 
are d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from the present c a s e . In one of the cases 
c i t e d by defendant, J3nii£CL££flifiS_i.*J2fll£liifl# 633 F.2d 1313,1317 
(9th C ir . 1980) , CfiJLL^dfiDifid, 450 U.S. 1043, SBB£3l-.a£££I 
Xfimaodf 699 F.2d 461 the court there ruled that a passenger had 
no standing to chal lenge the search of a paper bag in the 
v e h i c l e ' s trunk when the s top was lawfu l . £££ Alfifl ttcCiansy-JLt 
££&££# 381 So.2d 102, 105-06 (Ala. Cr. App. 1980) (defendant, who 
was passenger in car lawful ly stopped, lacked standing t o 
chal lenge s e a r c h ) . 
In the other cases c i t e d by the defendant the courts 
ruled that a defendant who received permission to use a v e h i c l e 
* The State must concede that there i s subs tant ia l authority 
contrary to Yaldfii on the quest ion of whether a d r i v e r , who has 
the v e h i c l e owner's permission to possess and drive i t , has 
standing to chal lenge a search of the v e h i c l e when a l a e f u l s top 
i s made. £xflA , I2ni*£a_Sifli££-X*-EfiI*ilJLfi# 633 F.2d 1313, 1317 (9th C ir . 1980); Unit£d«fiJtfli£fi-^J3chS# 595 F.2d 1247 (2d Cir . 
1979) , C£tfc. flfiDifidf 444 U.S. 955; StflDfi-JU-S&aJtfi, 162 Ga. App. 
654, 292 S.E.2d 525 (1982) . However, in the ins tant case i t was 
the co-defendant, not the defendant who had permission to use the 
v e h i c l e . Defendant was merely a passenger in the v e h i c l e , 
present only by i n v i t a t i o n of Mr. V i l l a , the co-defenaant . 
from the owner had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
vehicle* However, in the instant case defendant nowhere asserts 
that he had direct permission from the owner to use the vehicle, 
instead defendant was merely a passenger in the vehicle. In 
fact, defendant continuously denied any acknowledgement of the 
secret compartment in the trunk and its contents (SHT. 21-23). 
Because defendant has failed to prove that he had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the vehicle, he is without standing to 
contest the search. 
BECAUSE STAT£-YjLJ3iCE£Ii IS INAPPLICABLE IN 
THE PRESENT CASE, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR 
IN GIVING A JURY INSTRUCTION ON AIDING AND 
ABETTING. 
Defendant contends that it was error to give an 
instruction to the jury on aiding and abetting, pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-2-202 (1978). Defendant relies upon Utah Code 
Ann. S 58-37-19 (1986) which provides that: 
It is the purpose of this act to 
regulate and control the substances desig-
nated within § 58-37-4, and whenever the 
requirements prescribed, the offenses defined 
or the penalties imposed relating to SUD-
stances controlled by this act shall be or 
appear to be in conflict with Title 58, 
Chapter 17 or any other laws of this state, 
the provisions of this act shall be 
controlling. 
In the present case defendant was charged with Utah 
Code Ann. §58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1986), possession of a controlled 
suostance with intent to distribute. At trial, instructions on 
possession,and aiding and abetting, Utah Code Ann. $76-2-202 
(1978), went to the jury. Defendant excepted to the instruction 
on the basis that if he assisted the co-defendant then he should 
have been charged with arranging a d i s t r i b u t i o n under Utah Code 
Ann* S 5 8 - 3 7 - 8 ( 1 ) ( a ) ( i v ) (1986)» S£flt£_XA_Hick£D# 659 P.2d 1038 
(Utah 1983) | and ££fljfc£-X*_SCQU, 732 P.2d 117 (Utah 1987) • 
Defendant's r e l i a n c e upon Bidden and Sfiflti i s 
misplaced. In flicker)f the defendant arranged for an undercover 
agent to purchase drugs from a third party . Defendant was 
suoseguently arrested and charged with d i s t r i b u t i o n under Utah 
Code Ann. S 5 8 - 3 7 - 8 ( 1 ) ( a ) ( i i ) (1953 as amended). Defendant 
s u c c e s s f u l l y argued that s ince he did not a c t u a l l y d i s t r i b u t e the 
drugs, he should have been charged with arranging, not 
d i s t r i b u t i o n . The State argued that defendant would have been 
g u i l t y of d i s t r i b u t i o n under S 76-2 -202 , s ince defendant would 
have s o l i c i t e d , requested, commanded, encouraged or aided another 
person to engage in that criminal conduct. The Court ruled that 
an i n s t r u c t i o n on aiding and abett ing should not have gone to the 
jury because "the Controlled Substance Act express ly and 
s p e c i f i c a l l y sanct ions the offense of arranging . . . [and] i t 
thus d i s p l a c e s . . . the general sanct ion for aiding another 
provided for in in § 76-2-202 of the Criminal Code." Ifl. at 
1040. 
In S£S.t£_JU_£CQU, 732 P.2d 117 (Utah 1987) an 
informant purchased a bag of marijuana at the defendant's house. 
Because no one at t r i a l could t e s t i f y as to who handed over the 
marijuana and who took the money at defendant's home, the 
evidence admitted a t t r i a l l e f t in doubt how the exchange of the 
marijuana and money took p l a c e . The SfiflJLt Court s ta ted that "a 
person cannot be charged with aiding and abetting another when he 
or she handles the negotiations and price of a controlled 
substance, but must instead be charged with agreeing, consenting , 
offering, or negotiating to distribute a controlled substance as 
specifically provided in S 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv)." Id. at 120. The 
Court also defined the offense of arranging as follows: "Itlhe 
actus reus under section 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) constitutes an act ot 
agreement, consent, offer, or arrangement to distribute." Id* at 
120. 
Recently, the Utah Supreme Court defined the offense of 
arranging in S£at£-JU_££IlfLQ$ 54 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (March 24, 
1987). There, the Court stated that one commitea the crime of 
arranging when he discussed the purchase with officers, set a 
price for the marijuana, and agreed to make the exchange. 
In £i£&££i and £££££ the defendants were improperly 
charged with distribution. When it became clear at trial that 
defendants did not distribute, but instead arranged for the 
distribution of the drugs, the State then attempted to provide an 
instruction to the jury on aiding and abetting under § 76-2-202. 
However, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-19 clearly provides that 
defendants had to be charged under the appropriate provision in 
the Controlled Substances act. Because a specific provision in 
the Controlled Substance act prohibited the offense of arranging, 
defendants should have been charged with violation of that 
provision and the instuction on aiding and abetting was improper. 
In the instant case no facts exist to support a charge 
ot arranging; there is no evidence in the record that defendant 
discussed a purchase with anyone, set a price for the sale of the 
cocaine, or participated in the exchange of the drugs for money• 
£££ JBfi&fJLQ 54 Utah Adv. Rep. 15. Defendant was properly charged 
under S 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) with possession with intent to 
distribute. The instruction on aiding and abetting was necessary 
only in the event the jury should find that it was the co-
defendant who really owned the cocaine and defendant was merely 
assisting in the possession. If the jury had found defendant 
guilty of aiding under S 76-2-202 they still would have found 
defendant guilty of possession with intent to distribute since no 
facts existed to find defendant guilty of arranging. CflDiLB 
£:UJt£_,SU_S£flt£# 732 P.2d 117 (Utah 1987). 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING AN 
AFFIDAVIT AND SEARCH WARRANT FOR A 
CAL1FORINIA RESIDENCE. 
At trial the State called Detective Barfield, of the 
Los Angeles Police Department, to testify regarding items seized 
during a search of a residence in Southern California.3 As 
foundation for his testimony the State introduced exhibit #11, an 
affidavit and search warrant for the search in California. 
Defendant objected to the admission of exhibit til on 
several grounds, three of which he raises on appeal. First, 
defenoant contends that the exhibit was hearsay and not 
admissible. Second, defendant complains that the evidence was 
3
 The items seized during the search include identification cards 
belonging to defendant (T. 131) and a handwritten document made 
by defendant (T. 132, exhibit 14) identified as a dope ledger 
(T.138). 
inadmissible under Utah R. Evid. 404 (1986) as evidence ot 
defendant's character. Finally, defendant argues that under Utah 
R. Evid. 403 (1986) the evidence should have been excluded 
because of its prejudicial effect. The State will first address 
whether the evidence was admissible. 
It is well established that this Court should not 
"disturb the ruling of the trial court on the admissibility of 
evidence unless it clearly appears that the lower court was in 
error." S£fl.fc£_JU_S3ll£Sfi£, 712 P.2d 207, 209 (Utah 1985). The 
Utah Supreme Court has stated that "lt]he trial court's ruling on 
the admissibility of evidence will not be reversed absent a 
showing that the trial court so abused its discretion as to 
create a likelihood that injustice resulted." S£a££_XA.JBflXballr 
710 P.2d 168 (Utah 1985). 
Exhibit #11 was properly admissible as non-hearsay 
evidence. Utah R. Evid. 801(c) (1986) provides that "hearsay is 
a statement . . . offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted." The Utah Supreme Court has stated that when " 
an out-of-court statement is offered only to prove that the 
statement was made, without regard to its truth of falsity, it is 
not proscribed by the hearsay rule. " £ia£fi_XA_flu£CbinS2Il, 655 
P.2d 635, 636 (Utah 1982) .4 
In the instant case the exhibit was offered to lay a 
foundation for the subsequent acts of the orticer (T. 125-127). 
As the court stated; 
4
 While fiiflJtfi-XjL^fliltChilUBaD# 655 P.2d 635 (Utah 1982), was 
decided under former rule 63, Utah Rules of Evidence (1973), the 
Committee Note to Rule 801 states that the present definition ot 
hearsay is substantially similar to Rule 63. 
•it (the search warrant] has a purpose 
because it becomes a foundation for his 
testimony . . . ItJhe State is contending 
that based on a search warrant issued out of 
a Court of record in California, the search 
was made and certain things were found . . • 
I think that the State is certainly entitled 
to show the legality of the action the 
officers took in order to reach the testimony 
that they're going to give." 
(T.125-127)• The truth of the search warrant and a f f i d a v i t was 
not an i s sue a t t r i a l . I t was merely offered to show tnat the 
o f f i c e r l e g a l l y searched the Cal i forn ia res idence . 
Even assuming the offered evidence was hearsay and 
should not have been admitted, defendant has f a i l e d to prove any 
pre jud ice . Utah R. Evid. 103 (19 86) provides in part that "error 
may not be predicated upon a rul ing which admits or excludes 
evidence unless a subs tant ia l r ight of the party i s af fected • • 
." Error i s r e v e r s i b l e only i f a review of the record persuades 
the court that without the error there was "a reasonable 
l i d e l i b o o d of a more favorable r e s u l t for the defendant." fiiflifi 
£i_Efin£an£# 680 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984) . 
Mo where in neither the search warrant nor the 
a f f i d a v i t i s any reference made to defendant (see e x h i b i t #11)• 
Further, defenaant even admited a t t r i a l that he was not named in 
e i t h e r the warrant or the a f f i d a v i t (T. 120) . While the 
subsequent testimony by Officer Bart i e ld was c e r t a i n l y damaging 
to defendant, the e x h i b i t i t s e l f was not pre jud ic ia l and only 
l a i d foundation for the test imony. 
Defendant next c laims the evidence should have been 
excluded under Utah R. Evid. 403 and 404(b) (1986) . 
Rule 403 provides: 
• 1 4 -
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
Rule 40 4(b) providesi 
Evidence of otner crimes, wrongs or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof 
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence ot 
mistake or accident. 
Both rules are inapplicable to the present case. 
Because neither the affidavit nor the warrant mentions defendant, 
they could not logically hurt his character under Rule 40 4. 
Further, because defendant has failed to establish any prejudice. 
Rule 403 is inapplicable. 
If defendant has any argument with regard to the 
admissibility of exhibit #11 it may be one of relevancy since the 
document fails to mention defendant. However, since defendant 
does not raise this issue it does not merit discussion. £f. 
£tfll£_X*_£uLtflD# Utah, No. 20191, slip op. n. 16 at 15-16 (1987) 
(Defendant challenged testimony on competency grounds and Court 
found that it was not an issue. The Court stated that had 
defendant challenged the reliability of the testimony the Court 
may have been willing to review it, but since it was not raised 
it did not merit discussion). 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO 
RVIDRNCR A DOPE LEDGER MADE BY DEFENDANT 
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Defendant contends that exhibit #14 containing 
handwritten documents made by him should have been excluded under 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b) (1986), and Utah R. Evid. 403 (1986). 
At trial, detective Barfield testified that during the 
search ot the California residence named in the search warrant, a 
handwritten document, exhibit #14, was discovered (T. 132). 
Agent La Suis', an agent with the Drug Enforcement Administration 
Department of Justice, testified that exhibit #14 was a dope 
ledger containing information of deliveries of drugs to buyers 
(T. 138). Defendant testified that exhibit #14 contained his 
handwriting, and that he made the entries in tne document at the 
request of a third party (T. 177-78). 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that it will not 
interfere with the trial court's ruling on evidentiary matters 
unless it clearly appears that the court so abused its discretion 
that there is a likelihood that injustice resulted. Slate.** 
BQQlAin* 706 P.2d 603, 604 (Utah 1985). The relevancy of 
evidence admitted under Rule 404 is within the discretion of the 
trial judge. £±fl.t£_JU_Iflnii£X, 675 P.2d 539 (Utah 1983) 5 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b) provides that: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proot 
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident. 
5
 JanufcX c i t e s to Rule 55, Utah R. Evid. (1971) which i s 
substantively the same as Utah R. Evid. 404 (1986). 
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•While evidence ot other bad ac t s i s inadmissible to 
show the general d i s p o s i t i o n of the defendant, such evidence, 
when re levant and competent, i s admissible to prove a material 
f a c t . * S£fl£fi_XA_Shs£ffil, 725 P.2d 1301 f 1307 (Utah 1986) c i t i n g 
££a££_X*_2aiU2££f 675 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah 1983) . S&St Slfifi S l a t e 
JUJEfliayJtlJf 641 P.2d 1172 (Utah 1982) . 
In the ins tant c a s e , the evidence was not offered to 
show a bad d i s p o s i t i o n on the part of defendant. The State had 
the burden to prove that defendant possessed the cocaine with the 
in tent to d i s t r i b u t e i t for va lue . Defendant had f i l e d a 
document in court denying any knowledge ot the cocaine or of any 
drug transact ions (T. 6 3 , 103)* 6 Thus, the State was put to the 
task of proving that defendant possessed the r e q u i s i t e in tent to 
commit the crime with which he was charged. The e x h i b i t admitted 
did not contain any evidence of arres t s or conv ic t ions ot 
defendant for other cr imes , instead the evidence was merely a 
drug ledger kept by defendant of drug transact ions conducted by 
defendant in Ca l i forn ia . In l i g h t of defendant's contention tnat 
he was unaware of any drug t r a n s a c t i o n s , the evidence was 
re levant and necessary to prove defendant's opportunity to 
posses s the coca ine , defendant's knowledge of a major 
d i s t r i b u t i o n scheme, and the intent to p a r t i c i p a t e in that 
scheme. 
6
 Defendant moved for a severance of h i s case from co-defendant, 
V i l l a ' s case on the ground that defendant intended to t e s t i f y at 
t r i a l that he had no knowledge of cocaine in the v e h i c l e , and 
further , that he had never been involved in any type of drug 
tra f f i ck ing (R. 44, T. 1 0 3 ) . 
Defendant argues that exhibit #14 may have been 
properly admissible as rebuttal evidence to impeach the 
credibility of defendant, however, it should not have been 
admitted during the State's case in chief. First, the State had 
the burden to prove defendant possessed the requisite intent to 
commit the crime with which he was charged. Second, defendant 
had filed documents with the court indicating that he planned to 
testify that he was unaware of the cocaine in the car. Be also 
argued at the suppression hearing that he did not own the vehicle 
containing the cocaine and was unaware of any drugs in the 
vehicle. Thus, the State was put on notice that defendant would 
be claiming lack of knowledge regarding the cocaine and it would 
be necessary for the State to connect defendant to the cocaine. 
Defendant next argues that assuming the evidence was 
admissible, it should have been excluded because of the 
prejudicial effect on defendant's case. 
Under Rule 104(a), Utah R. Evid. (1986) it is the trial 
court's responsibility to determine any preliminary questions 
concerning the admissibility ot evidence. Rule 403, Utah R. 
Evid. (1986), states several reasons for which a court may decide 
not to admit relevant evidence. Rule 403 provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion ot the issue, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste ot time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
These two rules place the exclusion of unfairly prejudicial 
evidence within the discretion of the trial court. It is not 
mandatory that the court exclude all unfairly prejudicial 
evidence} the rule merely allows that the court may exclude such 
evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice." 
The admission of evidence under Rule 403 is a matter 
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and a trial 
court's decision to admit evidence will not be overturned absent 
an abuse of discretion* ££fl££-JU-.Gaxcia, 663 P.2d 60, 64 (Utah 
1983)| £*fl.t£_XA_CiflUd, 722 P.2d 750 (Utah 1986) • 
In the instant case, this Court should not interfere 
with the trial court's decision to allow the document into 
evidence unless the trial court so abused its discretion that 
there is a liklihood ot injustice* 
Although the admission of the exhibit may have created 
some danger of prejudice, it was not substantially outweighed by 
the danger of undue prejudice. Stfltfi^JU-McClaiD* 706 P.2d 603 
(Utah 1985). The jury was entitled to examine the document 
because "Itlhe jury is entitled to know the truth of the 
situation in order to arrive at a just verdict.• £££££_¥* 
£dQlS£Xf 599 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1979). 
CQBCLflSiQfl 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to atfirm defendant's conviction. 
DATED t h i s _ /^2 day ot June, 1987. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
KIMBERLY K. HORNAK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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